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PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE PROXY ACCESS DEBATE 
By Lucian A. Bebchuk∗ and Scott Hirst∗∗
 
This Article examines two “meta” issues raised by opponents of the SEC’s proposal to provide 
shareholders with rights to place director candidates on the company’s proxy materials. First, opponents 
argue that, even assuming proxy access is desirable in many circumstances, the existing no-access default 
should be retained and the adoption of proxy access arrangements should be left to opting out of this 
default on a company-by-company basis. This Article, however, identifies strong reasons against 
retaining no-access as the default. There is substantial empirical evidence indicating that director 
insulation from removal is associated with lower firm value and worse performance. Furthermore, when 
opting out from a default arrangement serves shareholder interests, a switch is more likely to occur when 
it is favored by the board than when disfavored by the board. We analyze the impediments to 
shareholders’ obtaining opt-outs that they favor but the board does not, and we present evidence 
indicating that such impediments are substantial. The asymmetry in the reversibility of defaults 
highlighted in this Article should play an important role in default selection.  
Second, opponents of the SEC’s proposed reforms argue that, if the SEC adopts a proxy access 
regime, shareholders should be free to opt out of this regime. We point out the tensions between 
advocating such opting out and the past positions of many of the opponents, as well as tensions between 
opting out and the general approach of the proxy rules. Nonetheless, we support allowing shareholders to 
opt out of a federal proxy access regime, provided that the opt-out process includes necessary safeguards. 
Opting out should require majority approval by shareholders in a vote where the benefits to shareholders 
of proxy access are adequately disclosed, and shareholders should be able to reverse past opt-out 
decisions by a majority vote at any time.  
The implications of our analysis extend beyond proxy access to the choice of default rules for 
corporate elections, and to the ways in which shareholders should be able to opt out of election defaults. 
In particular, the current plurality voting default should be replaced with a majority voting default, and 
existing impediments to the ability of shareholders to opt out of arrangements that make it difficult to 
replace directors should be re-examined.  
 
Keywords: Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholder voting, corporate elections, 
corporate governance, directors, default rules, private ordering, boards. 
JEL Classifications: G3, G38, K2, K22. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of shareholders to place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials 
is an issue that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been considering for 
over sixty years.1 In its 2009 proposed rule, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, the 
SEC has once again revisited this topic.2 Specifically, the reform proposes a new rule that would 
become Rule 14a-11 (“Rule 14a-11”) of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 The proposed Rule 14a-11 would, under certain 
circumstances, require companies to include shareholder nominees for director elections in the 
companies’ proxy materials.4
The SEC has received a welter of comments regarding the proposed reform.5 Although 
the adoption of a federal proxy access regime has received significant support from shareholder 
groups and those who work with them,6 the proposed reform faces strong opposition from the 
corporate side; comments in opposition have been submitted by many of the country’s largest 
corporations, the Business Roundtable,7 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,8 and other business 
                                                 
1 See Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10653 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
2 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 
29024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274) [hereinafter 
Proposed Rule]. 
3 See id. at 29032. 
4 Id. at 29032–33. 
5 534 comment letters (or memoranda noting meetings with SEC commissioners or staff members) were 
received through the end of September 2009. All comment letters are available at U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). 
6 See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-78.pdf. 
7 See Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Eaton Corp., and Chair, 
Corp. Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf [hereinafter 
Business Roundtable Letter].  
8 See Letter from David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-181.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Letter].  
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 organizations, as well as many prominent corporate law firms and bar groups.9 Many of the 
commentators opposed to the SEC’s proposal hold the view that proxy access would generally be 
value-reducing for publicly traded firms. Whether this is the case was the subject of an exchange 
between Martin Lipton and one of us published by The Business Lawyer in 2003, when the SEC 
previously considered proxy access reform.10 This time, however, many commentators also 
stress a set of additional “meta-arguments” against the adoption of a federal proxy regime: they 
argue that the proposed reform should be opposed even if proxy access is desirable in many or 
most publicly traded companies11. We focus in this Article on these meta-arguments. We will 
refer to those commentators who make one or both of these meta-arguments collectively as the 
“Proposal Opponents.” While the views expressed by the Proposal Opponents differ in various 
respects, this Article will focus on their common use of the meta-arguments to oppose the SEC’s 
proposal. 
Part II of this Article focuses on the argument made forcefully by the Proposal Opponents 
that, even if proxy access is desirable, it should be adopted in a more limited fashion than 
proposed by the SEC—by private ordering against the background of a no-access default rule. 
The Proposal Opponents are willing to support the SEC’s proposal to amend Rule 14a-8 to allow 
shareholders to place proposals with respect to director nomination procedures on the corporate 
ballot;12 once such an amendment is adopted, they argue, the adoption of proxy access can be 
left to private ordering in the marketplace. Such private ordering, they argue, can be expected to 
produce a proxy access arrangement in any company in which such access is desirable. Such an 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Bus. Law 
Section,  to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf [hereinafter ABA Letter]. 
10 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 48–64 
(2003); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 557–68 
(2005). 
11 See, e.g., Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 7 at 45-46 (“the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8 
would enable shareholders and companies to implement proxy access provisions that are adapted to the 
distinct characteristics and needs of the individual company”).  More generally, in advancing arguments 
in favor of leaving the adoption of access arrangements to private ordering,  Proposal Opponents 
presuppose that shareholders of some companies will wish to implement proxy access.  
12 See Proposed Rule, supra note 4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29031. 
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 argument for retaining the existing no-access default is made not only by many comments in the 
SEC file but also by Joseph Grundfest in in a recent discussion paper.13
We argue that this objection by the Proposal Opponents should be rejected. The Proposal 
Opponents are not justified in conflating a preference for private ordering with a preference for 
the current no-access default. A preference for private ordering may provide a basis for allowing 
opting out of whatever default is selected, but does not favor any specific default. In particular, 
assuming that shareholders will be allowed to opt out of the chosen default, we discuss two clear 
reasons why a no-access default is inferior to, and dominated by, an access default. First, the 
existing empirical evidence and considerations of director accountability suggest that an access 
default is more likely to be an efficient arrangement for most public companies. Moreover, 
efficient opt-outs are much easier to execute when the board of directors favors opting out than 
when it does not. Our analysis of the impediments facing opt-outs to an access regime from a no-
access default indicates that, in many companies where they would be efficient and favored by 
shareholders, such opt-outs are likely not to occur—or to occur only after a long and costly 
delay.  
Having concluded that the SEC should set access as a default, we focus in Part III on the 
question of whether opting out of the default to a no-access regime should be permitted, as the 
Proposal Opponents forcefully advocate. There is a tension between the Proposal Opponents’ 
position in favor of allowing opting out of Rule 14a-11 and (i) the opposition most of the 
Proposal Opponents expressed in 2007 to facilitating opting out by shareholders from the current 
no-access default, and (ii) their support—or tacit acceptance—of shareholders’ inability to opt 
out of various arrangements that currently make it more difficult for shareholders to replace 
directors. The Proposal Opponents overstate the strength of the case for allowing shareholders to 
opt out of the adopted federal access regime. Indeed, precluding such opting out would be 
consistent with the long-standing approach of the proxy rules and the securities laws in general.  
On balance, however, we support SEC consideration of allowing opting out to no-access, 
provided that the opting-out process contains adequate safeguards to ensure that proxy access is 
denied only in those cases where shareholders are and remain in favor of opting out. In 
                                                 
13 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 64, available at 
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 particular, any opting out of the SEC’s access regime should require shareholder majority 
approval in a vote in which the benefits to shareholders of an access regime are adequately 
disclosed, and shareholders should be able to reverse past opt-out decisions by a majority vote at 
any time. Permitting opting out of the SEC’s access regime should also lead to a general 
reconsideration of shareholders’ current inability to opt out of arrangements that make it difficult 
to replace directors.  
The analysis presented in this Article has implications beyond the proxy access debate. 
By analyzing the differences in the ease of passing efficient changes when such changes are 
supported or opposed by boards, the discussion highlights a consideration that should play an 
important role in the setting of corporate governance arrangements in general and those 
governing corporate elections in particular. For example, the analysis suggests that majority 
voting should become the default arrangement rather than merely a standard from which firms 
are free to opt out. Similarly, the analysis of how opting out from Rule 14a-11 should be 
conducted has implications for opting out of other rules governing corporate elections. 
II. SHOULD NO-ACCESS REMAIN THE DEFAULT RULE? 
This Part focuses on the Proposal Opponents’ argument that, even if proxy access is 
desirable for the shareholders of many companies, the current no-access default and the adoption 
of proxy access arrangements should be left to the marketplace—that is, to private adoption by 
individual companies. A no-access default with the freedom to opt in to an access regime is far 
from the best response to the proxy access issue. In particular, it is inferior to, and dominated by, 
a federal access regime with freedom for shareholders to opt out of proxy access. For the 
purposes of this Part’s analysis, we will assume that whatever default rule is chosen—an access 
regime or a no-access regime—will allow shareholders to opt out of the rule. And we will focus 
on examining whether the case made by Proposal Opponents that the default rule should be no-
access is well grounded. For ease of exposition, we first put forward the case against retaining 
the no-access default assuming that shareholders’ preferences are binary—for either the no-
access regime or for the access regime offered by Rule 14a-11; at the end of this Part we 
introduce the possibility that shareholders prefer some other access regime and show that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491670, forthcoming in The Business Lawyer..  
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 case against a no-access default remains strong when this initial simplifying assumption is 
relaxed.  
Section A of this Part explains why a preference for private ordering should not by itself 
lead—as the Proposal Opponents seem to believe—to favoring the current no-access default. 
Sections B and C discuss the two main reasons why an access default should be favored: proxy 
access is more likely to be efficient for most public companies, and efficient opt-outs are easier 
to achieve when the board favors them than when the board does not, making it more difficult for 
shareholders favoring proxy access to opt out of a no-access default than it would be for 
shareholders favoring no-access to opt out of a federal access regime.  
A. The Conflation of Opposition to Proxy Access with Preference for Private Ordering 
A central argument put forward repeatedly by the Proposal Opponents is that, even 
assuming that access is beneficial for many public companies, the optimal approach is to retain 
no-access as the default arrangement and let the provision of shareholder access evolve through 
the adoption of access arrangement on a company-by-company basis.14 To facilitate such 
adoption, the Proposal Opponents now endorse a position many of them opposed in 2007: 
allowing shareholders to place on the corporate ballot proposals with respect to director 
nominations.15 The Proposal Opponents stress the virtues of “private ordering,” which can tailor 
arrangements to companies’ particular circumstances, and seem to believe that a preference for 
private ordering and “one size does not fit all” cuts strongly against SEC intervention to provide 
a proxy access regime.16  
                                                 
14 See note 11, supra. 
15 See, e.g., Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 4–5 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
212.pdf [hereinafter Seven Firm Letter]; ABA Letter, supra note 9, at 4. 
16 See, e.g., Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 6–7 (recommending that shareholders be permitted “to 
submit proxy access proposals that are designed to fit a company’s particular circumstances” and that 
companies would “benefit from the flexibility to adopt the type and form of proxy access standard that 
best reflects the will of the stockholders, rather than a uniform, one-size-fits-all standard”); Business 
Roundtable Letter, supra note 7, at 45 (suggesting that “permitting shareholders to propose amendments 
to a company’s bylaws to facilitate proxy access would allow shareholders to take advantage of the 
opportunity that state law affords to tailor a system of proxy access to the needs of the individual 
company”).  
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 However, it is a mistake to conflate a preference for private ordering and “one size does 
not fit all” with a preference for a no-access default, as the Proposal Opponents do. There is no 
reason to assume as the Proposal Opponents do, that private ordering should begin from a no-
access default. A preference for private ordering merely implies a preference for allowing opting 
out from whichever default is set, and does not imply that the ideal default is no-access. No 
matter what the default rule, it is possible to have private ordering: if the default rule provides for 
proxy access, there can be private ordering by allowing corporations to opt out of the regime;17 if 
the default rule is no-access, there can be private ordering by allowing shareholders to opt in to 
proxy access. Therefore, although Proposal Opponents base many of their arguments on a 
preference for private ordering, such a preference cannot provide a basis for opposition to the 
provision of an access regime. A preference for private ordering is fully consistent with a proxy 
access regime as long as opting out is permitted by the regime. The Proposal Opponents’ 
position is thus grounded not in their preference for private ordering but in their preference for a 
no-access default over an access default.18  
Grundfest recognizes the need to make an argument in favor of a no-access default, and 
he claims that, in choosing among alternative defaults, no-access is the only acceptable choice.19 
He argues that the SEC should not adopt an access default without first conducting a scientific 
survey of shareholders in public companies to confirm that shareholders prefer to have proxy 
access.20 This argument implicitly relies on a presumption in favor of a no-access default. We 
see no reason for such a presumption. Furthermore, and most importantly, the analysis below 
shows that there is a strong basis for favoring an access default over the current no-access 
default.  
                                                 
17 Note that allowing opting out of the regime—what Joseph Grundfest refers to as “symmetric opt-out”—
is different from the current proposed Rule 14a-11, which would only allow shareholders to make the rule 
less restrictive for shareholder proposals, and not more restrictive (what Grundfest refers to as an 
“asymmetric opt-out”). See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 4.
18 The fact that Proposal Opponents have a strong preference not just for private ordering over federal 
intervention but also for having no-access as the default is also evident from the fact that nowhere in their 
submissions, nor at any time prior to this debate—including during the discussion of the recent 
amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law to add section 112  allowing opting in to proxy 
access—did any of the Proposal Opponents seek to have access as the default arrangement under state 
law. 
19 See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 16.
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 B. The Benefits of Proxy Access 
In choosing between two or more arrangements for a default rule, a natural starting point 
is to ask which arrangement is more likely to be efficient. If it is as easy to opt out of a no-access 
default as to opt out of an access default (although we shall see this is not the case), the 
consideration of which arrangement is more likely to be efficient in most cases should be 
decisive. Both the logic of corporate accountability and the available empirical evidence indicate 
that an access default is more likely to be efficient than a no-access default. 
Given the central role of directors in corporate governance, their selection and incentives 
are important: Corporate law provides shareholders with the power to replace boards in order to 
ensure that directors are adequately selected and perform well.21 This power should create 
accountability and incentivize directors to serve shareholders’ interests.22 However, existing 
arrangements make it difficult for shareholders to replace directors, and give incumbents 
substantial advantages over outsiders who might seek to replace them in the event of 
unsatisfactory performance. For example, incumbents’ campaign expenses are borne completely 
by the company, but outsiders have to pay their own campaign costs.23 Thus, challengers who 
might be able to improve the management of the company may be discouraged from running 
because they will bear all of the costs but capture only a fraction of the benefits from any 
improvement in governance.24 Electoral challenges are in fact quite infrequent.25  
Although proxy access would not eliminate the disadvantages facing challengers, it 
would reduce them somewhat. Challengers would still bear costs that incumbents can charge to 
the company, but in some circumstances challengers would avoid the costs of distributing proxy 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 See id. at 23.
21 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are 
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their 
disposal to turn the board out.” (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)). 
22 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that “[t]he 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power 
rests”). 
23 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 394–96 (1986). 
24 See id. at 390–96; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1088–96 (1990).  
25 For empirical evidence on the incidence of electoral challenges, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of 
the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise]. 
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 cards to shareholders and paying for their return, and would also avoid intangible disadvantages 
that may result from being on a separate card.26 By making it easier for shareholders to replace 
directors, proxy access can contribute to making directors more accountable to shareholders and 
more attentive to their interests. The primary benefits of proxy access would result not so much 
from its use, but from its availability and its general effect on directors’ incentives and behavior.  
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that 
making boards more accountable by invigorating corporate elections increases shareholder 
value.27 Empirical studies consistently find that proxy fights are associated with an increase in 
shareholder wealth.28 These studies focus on the ex post effects of proxy contests (their effects 
on shareholder wealth once a proxy contest has taken place), and do not consider the ex ante 
benefits of proxy contests (the effects of the prospect of a proxy contest on boards in general). 
Even though these studies therefore focus only on a subset of the benefits of electoral challenges, 
their findings are clearly consistent with the effect of such challenges being positive.29
Furthermore, there is considerable empirical evidence that reducing incumbent directors’ 
insulation from removal has, overall, a beneficial ex ante effect on the management of public 
companies. Empirical studies have found that increased insulation from management removal by 
change of control produces  poorer management decisions and performance along a significant 
number of dimensions. Among other things, there is evidence that: 
                                                 
 
26 See comments of Roy Katzovicz in Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst eds, The Harvard Law School Proxy 
Access RoundtableHarvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 661 (2010), page 55. 
27 For a review of this evidence, see Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 711–14.  
28 See Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An 
Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1992, 
at 22; Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held 
Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate 
Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); David Ikenberry & Josef 
Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 
405, 432–33 (1993); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: 
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998). 
29 In its comment letter, the RiskMetrics Group indicates that it has tracked the returns of a portfolio of 
companies where activists gained board seats in 2005, and found that this portfolio outperformed the S&P 
500 index over the subsequent four-year period. See Letter from Martha Carter, Head of Global Research 
& Global Policy Bd., RiskMetrics Group, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 
(Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-166.pdf [hereinafter 
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 • The passage of anti-takeover statutes is accompanied by increases in “managerial slack”;30  
• Companies whose managers enjoy more protection from takeovers are associated with poorer 
operating performance—including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth—
and are more likely to engage in empire-building;31  
• Acquisitions made by companies with stronger anti-takeover protection are more likely to be 
value-decreasing;32  
• Anti-takeover protection is associated with higher compensation levels;33  
• Anti-takeover protection is associated with lower sensitivity of compensation to performance, 
and with lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance;34
• The removal of anti-takeover protection is associated with increases in stock market value;35 
and  
• Greater insulation from removal via a takeover is correlated with lower firm value (as 
measured by the standard Tobin’s Q measure).36
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical study identifying a beneficial aspect of 
entrenching management is that by Bates, Becher, and Lemmon.37 This study found that 
                                                                                                                                                             
RiskMetrics Group Letter] (concluding that it “appears that election of a shareholder-nominated director 
may create value over a multi-year period”).  
30 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using 
Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535, 545 (1999) (finding that the adoption of antitakeover 
statutes weakened managers’ incentives to minimize labor costs); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, 
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. 
FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (reporting that antitakeover statutes “allow managers to pursue goals other than 
maximizing shareholder wealth”). 
31 See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 107, 136–37 (2003).  
32 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 
1851, 1853 (2007).  
33 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Executive Compensation and Incentives: The 
Impact of Takeover Legislation at 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6830, 1998) 
(on file with The Business Lawyer). 
34 See Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. 
ECON. 501, 503 (2007). 
35 See Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of 
Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 275 (2008). 
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 staggered boards are associated with higher takeover premia.38 However, this study also shows 
that staggered boards are associated with a lower likelihood of an acquisition, and, more 
importantly, it confirms that, overall, staggered boards are associated with lower firm value.39 
On the whole, the body of empirical evidence provides strong reasons for believing that reducing 
the extent to which directors are insulated from removal would be value-enhancing.  
C. Default Choice and Reversibility  
Having so far focused on whether no-access or access is more likely to be efficient for 
most public companies, we now discuss another consideration that weighs heavily against 
choosing a no-access default: it would be far more difficult for shareholders to opt out of a no-
access default when doing so would be efficient, than it would for them to opt out of an access 
regime when doing so would be efficient. 
It is important to take into account the possibility that opting out of different default rules 
is not equally easy. In an imaginary Coasian world with no transaction costs, permitting opting 
out would always result in an efficient arrangement, no matter what the initial default. In the real 
world, however, there are impediments that may prevent efficient opting out, and it is necessary 
to consider the possibility that these impediments may vary depending on the default that is 
initially chosen. In particular, as was stressed in an article co-authored by one of us together with 
Assaf Hamdani, the choice of default in corporate and securities law should depend on which 
selection would be more easily “reversible” by shareholders wishing to see it changed.40 Under 
the reversible defaults theory developed in that article, it is important to take into account the fact 
that an efficient opting out is easier to accomplish and more likely to occur when a board of 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 30, at 110; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs 
of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 430 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, 
What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 783, 785 (2009). 
37 Thomas W. Bates, David A. Becher & Michael L. Lemmon, Board Classification and Managerial 
Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656 (2008). 
38 Id. at 658. 
39 Id. at 675–76. 
40 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults For Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 489, 489 (2002). 
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 directors favors such opting out than when the board disfavors it.41 Below we provide additional 
support for this view, explaining in detail the causes of this asymmetry as well as demonstrating 
its significance.  
When an efficient opt-out is favored by the board, it will likely be adopted. The board 
will have an incentive to bring the opt-out proposal to a vote, will have access to internal and 
external professionals with the necessary skills to draft and explain the proposal expertly, and 
will have the power to place the proposal and detailed reasons for it in the company’s proxy 
materials. In contrast, the adoption of an opt-out that is efficient and favored by shareholders but 
disfavored by the board will be much more uncertain due to the various impediments we 
describe in detail below.  
The asymmetry between opt-outs favored and disfavored by the board strengthens the 
case for selecting proxy access as the default rule. Indeed, the asymmetry provides a basis for 
selecting access as the default even if no-access is more likely to be the efficient default. 
Suppose, hypothetically, that proxy access is optimal for 45 percent of companies and no-access 
is optimal for 55 percent of companies; suppose further that shareholders are able to opt out in all 
cases in which opting out is favored by the board, but only in one-third of those cases in which 
opting out is disfavored by the board. In these circumstances, setting an access default would 
result in the more efficient arrangement prevailing in all companies: all of the 55 percent of 
companies for which the access default is inefficient and disfavored by shareholders will opt out. 
In contrast, setting a no-access default would result in 30 percent of companies ending up with 
an inefficient arrangement: of those 45 percent of companies for which no-access is inefficient, 
only one-third will opt out.  
Grundfest recognizes the need to take these asymmetries into account, arguing that they 
are reduced in this situation.42 However, even if this is the case, as long as there is an asymmetry 
that makes it easier to opt out of proxy access than to opt in, a default rule of proxy access will 
be preferable. Grundfest concedes that where there are asymmetries in favor of management, the 
default rule that is less preferred by management should be chosen.43 However, he claims that, 
because the adoption of proxy access could be done by a bylaw amendment without director 
                                                 
41 Id. at 502–03. 
42 See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 23.
43 Id. 
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 initiation, a different recommendation is appropriate.44 However, the passage that Grundfest 
cites for this proposition also states that, where collective action problems impede initiation of 
bylaw amendments by shareholders (as this section demonstrates), opting out by a bylaw 
amendment will not eliminate the asymmetry, and, as a result, some presumption in favor of 
arrangements more restrictive of managers is called for.45  
D. Impediments to Shareholder Bylaw Amendments and the Precatory Proposals Route  
Why do the Proposal Opponents expect the marketplace to effectively produce access 
arrangements whenever they are efficient? In assessing this question, it is worth noting that 
companies have had many years to adopt access bylaws and have not chosen to do so. State 
corporate law, including in Delaware, contains no restrictions on allowing shareholder access.46 
However, only three companies have put in place a proxy access arrangement, and each of these 
three instances is peculiar because of either the nature of the company or the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption of proxy access. One access bylaw was adopted by RiskMetrics Group, 
Inc., which advocates proxy access reform for the companies in which its clients invest;47 
another was adopted by a company that had as its chairman and significant block holder a well-
known shareholder activist who has strongly advocated proxy access;48 the third access bylaw 
was adopted by a firm attempting to recover from an option-backdating scandal that led to 
                                                 
44Id. (citing Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at 505). 
45 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at 505. 
46 Although the introduction of section 112 of the Delaware General Corporate Law makes it explicitly 
clear that bylaws may permit proxy access, see 2009 Del. Laws ch. 14, § 1 (Apr. 10, 2009) (H.B. 19) 
(West) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112), the permissibility of such bylaws was generally 
recognized prior to the enactment of section 112.  
47 See Section 2.6, Second Amended and Restated By-Laws of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. filed as Exhibit 
3.2 to Form S-1/A dated January 8, 2008. 
48 Apria Healthcare, Inc., had Ralph Whitworth, head of investment advisor Relational Investors LLC, as 
its chairman and significant stakeholder during the period in which it adopted a proxy access bylaw. Mr. 
Whitworth is a strong advocate of proxy reform, and advocated the change to the board. See Letter from 
Ralph V. Whitworth, Principal, Relational Investors LLC, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 1 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf. Apria 
Healthcare, Inc., has subsequently been acquired.  
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 criminal charges against three former executives.49 It is clear that the implementation of proxy 
access in those three cases resulted from unique circumstances.  
Why should we expect the future to be different from the past? The Proposal Opponents 
seem to believe that the future will be different if the SEC amends Rule 14a-8 (an amendment 
they now support) to allow shareholders to place on the corporate ballot proposals concerning 
director nomination procedures in general, and proxy access in particular. Shareholders’ ability 
to bring such proposals, it is argued, can generally be expected to produce access bylaws in 
companies in which such bylaws are efficient and favored by shareholders.  
It is worth noting that the process the Proposal Opponents have in mind appears to be one 
in which boards adopt access bylaws following shareholder proposals recommending such 
bylaws, rather than one in which shareholders adopt such bylaws directly. Although shareholders 
submit hundreds of proposals to publicly traded firms each year, the overwhelming majority of 
these proposals are precatory in nature; only a small fraction of shareholder proposals are 
proposals for binding bylaw amendments. In particular, during the last five proxy seasons, on 
average only twelve proposals for corporate governance bylaw amendments were voted on each 
year —about 3 percent of the proposals voted on during the season.50  
The use of bylaw proposals is impeded by the fact that, in many firms, the amendment of 
bylaws requires a supermajority: as of September 2009, 42 percent of public companies51 and 34 
                                                 
 
49 Comverse Technology, Inc., adopted a proxy access bylaw in 2007. See  Posting by Ted Allen to 
RiskMetrics Group Risk and Governance Blog, 
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/04/comverse_adopts_access_bylawsu.html (Apr. 27, 2007) (“Comverse 
Adopts Access Bylaw”). 
50 In the last two proxy seasons for which Georgeson Shareholder reports figures, the number of proposals 
to amend the bylaws was twelve in the 2007 proxy season (out of 375 corporate governance proposals), 
GEORGESON, 2007 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 20 fig. 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/usa/acgr09.php, and   seventeen in the 2008 proxy season (out of 
339 corporate governance proposals), GEORGESON, 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 22 
fig. 12 (2008), available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/usa/acgr09.php.   
51 This figure is based on a SharkRepellent.net search on September 6, 2009. Out of the 3,889 companies 
in the SharkRepellent.net universe (comprised of Russell 3000 companies and those companies that have 
had initial public offerings or implemented poison pills since 2001), a total of 1,624 companies had a 
supermajority vote requirement for amending the bylaws of the corporation. For subsequent confirmation 
of this point, see Beth Young, The Limits of Private Ordering: Restrictions on Shareholders’ Ability to 
Initiate Governance Change and Distortions of the Shareholder Voting Process 7 (Council of 
Institutional Investors, Nov. 2009), available at 
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 percent of the Fortune 500 required a supermajority approval for any shareholder-initiated 
bylaws.52 Indeed, even among companies that do not have a supermajority requirement, the 
standard requirement of approval by a majority of the outstanding shares makes passage 
conditional on obtaining a supermajority of the votes cast.  
Furthermore, the initiation of access bylaws by shareholders would be discouraged by the 
fact that Rule 14a-8 imposes a 500-word limit on the text of the proposed bylaw and the 
supporting statement.53 It might well be difficult to fit the text of an access bylaw that explicitly 
addresses most of the relevant elements (not to mention the supporting statement) within such a 
limit.54 For example, the model access bylaw recently put forward by the American Bar 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/The%20Limits%20of%20Private%20Ordering%20UPDATED%2011-
17-09.pdf (showing that 36.1 percent of Russell 1000 companies, 39.1 percent of Russell 3000 
companies, and 35.4 percent of S&P 500 companies employ a supermajority vote standard). That paper 
also suggests that another impediment to private ordering will exist for companies with multiple class 
capital structures with disparate voting rights (7.1 percent of S&P 500 companies, 8.8 percent of Russell 
1000 companies, and 7.5 percent of Russell 3000 companies), such that an access bylaw favored by 
shareholders holding a majority of the shares of the company by value may not receive a majority of total 
votes. Id. at 8. 
52 This figure is based on a SharkRepellent.net search on September 6, 2009. Out of the Fortune 500 
companies, 168 companies had a supermajority vote requirement for amending the bylaws of the 
corporation. 
53 See Proposed Rule, supra note 2, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29046. 
54 A shareholder wishing to have an access bylaw might believe, for example, that such a bylaw should 
ideally deal with, among other things, ownership and shareholding requirements of proponents, disclosure 
of information, and resolution procedures.  
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 Association Task Force on Shareholder Proposals contains 2,436 words,55 and the text of Rule 
14a-11 itself contains 1,929 words.56   
The Proposal Opponents have not expressed concerns about these considerable 
impediments to shareholder-initiated access bylaws. To make their support of opting out against 
the background of a no-access default tenable, they have to rely on the ability of shareholders to 
pass precatory shareholder resolutions recommending that the board adopt an access bylaw. 
Once Rule 14a-8 is amended to allow such precatory proposals, it might be argued, the boards of 
many companies can be expected to adopt access bylaws after the passage of such proposals or 
in anticipation of—and with a desire to preempt—the future passage of such proposals.57 
However, as the next subsections demonstrate, this process also cannot generally be relied upon 
to produce proxy access arrangements whenever shareholders prefer to have them.  
E. Lessons from Majority Voting and Staggered Boards 
It is instructive to begin by looking at the evidence on the diffusion of majority voting 
arrangements, which were often adopted by boards in response to or in anticipation of 
shareholder resolutions in favor of majority voting. In arguing that private ordering from a no-
access default could be relied on to produce proxy access arrangements whenever they would be 
                                                 
55 See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, ILLUSTRATIVE ACCESS BYLAW WITH 
COMMENTARY (June 15, 2009), available at 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL410000/sitesofinterest_files/illustrative_access_by
law.pdf  [hereinafter ABA MODEL BYLAW]. To take another example, the model bylaw circulated by 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz contains 1,401 words. See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, MODEL 
PROXY ACCESS BOARD RESOLUTION AND BY-LAW (May 7, 2009), ,available at 
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.16648.09.pdf [hereinafter 
Wachtell, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ MODEL BYLAW]. This model bylaw is discussed in Posting by 
Theodore Mirvis to Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/24/secs-proxy-access-proposal-undermines-state-federal-
balance/ (May 24, 2009, 7:24 EST) (“SEC’s Proxy Access Proposal Undermines State-Federal Balance”). 
Word counts were calculated in Microsoft Word after cutting and pasting the text of the bylaws (including 
section numbering, but excluding footnotes and explanatory text). 
56 See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29082–85. The number of words was calculated in 
Microsoft Word after cutting and pasting the text of Rule 14a-11 from the original PDF files version. The 
word count includes section numbering and section headings but excludes titles, footnotes, explanatory 
text, and instructions.  
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 efficient, the Proposal Opponents argue that the widespread adoption of majority voting from the 
plurality voting default via private ordering demonstrates that private ordering can produce 
desirable election reforms.58 The Business Roundtable Letter, for example, refers to the “swift 
adoption” of the majority voting standard, and states that some form of majority voting had been 
adopted by 75 percent of the Roundtable’s members by 2008.59  
In fact, however, the empirical evidence on the diffusion of majority voting highlights the 
limits of relying on private ordering by firms, rather than on a change in default arrangements, to 
produce necessary reforms. Consider a hypothetical situation in which majority voting is the 
default arrangement from which firms can opt out only with shareholder approval. Given the 
strong support for majority voting among investors,60 it is likely that the overwhelming majority 
of companies would not be able (and indeed would not try) to get shareholders to approve opting 
out of majority voting into plurality voting, and that most public firms would have majority 
voting in place. This is a very different outcome than that produced by firms opting out of the 
current default of plurality voting.  
In fact, several years after the widespread recognition of the desirability of a majority 
voting standard, a large fraction of public firms, including a large majority of smaller public 
firms, have not yet opted into majority voting. As of September 2009, data from RiskMetrics 
Group shows that only 60 percent of companies in the S&P 500 had majority voting (with an 
additional 15 percent having plurality voting with a director resignation policy), and that only a 
small minority of the large number of public companies outside the S&P 500 have majority 
voting.61 Of the 5,930 firms outside the S&P 500 that are followed by RiskMetrics Group, only 
12 percent have majority voting (an additional 5 percent had plurality voting with a director 
resignation policy).62 Altogether, of the 6,630 public firms in the RiskMetrics database, more 
                                                                                                                                                             
57 See, e.g., Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 1; ABA Letter, supra note 9, at 4; Business Roundtable 
Letter, supra note 7, at 3. 
58 See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 9, at  7–8, 12; Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 3, 6. 
59 See Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
60 Of the 220 proposals to change plurality voting to majority voting that have been voted on since 2007 
(as reported by SharkRepellent.net on September 6, 2009), the number of shareholders in favor of the 
resolution was 59 percent of the shares outstanding, and 70 percent of the votes cast in favor or against. 
61 E-mails from Carol Bowie, RiskMetrics Group, Inc., to Lucian Bebchuk (Oct. 9, 2009) (on file with 
The Business Lawyer). 
62 Id. 
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 than 80 percent have plurality voting without even a resignation policy for directors receiving a 
majority of withhold votes.63
The above evidence indicates that, as long as the default arrangement remains the same, 
many public firms can be expected to avoid opting out into arrangements that make director 
removal easier—even when there is strong support for such arrangements among shareholders. 
We discuss below in detail the reasons why private ordering cannot be relied upon to produce 
such governance improvements. The lessons from the incomplete diffusion of majority voting 
are worth keeping in mind while considering that analysis.  
Indeed, if the adoption of proxy access arrangements is left up to firms opting in to such 
arrangements, shareholders’ ability to implement the access arrangements they favor is likely to 
face even greater obstacles than those faced by majority voting. Most importantly, boards have 
generally displayed much more resistance to proxy access than to majority voting. In the 
beginning of this decade, both proxy access and majority voting were considered important 
measures for addressing growing concerns about corporate governance in general and corporate 
elections in particular.64 Both at the time and since, companies have been open to considering 
and adopting majority voting, but have been strongly opposed to proxy access.65 What might be 
the reasons for the difference in corporate attitudes? Perhaps incumbent directors and executives 
find majority voting less threatening because it does not create risks that outsiders not screened 
and selected by the incumbent team will join the board, or perhaps reasonable and persuasive 
objections to majority voting are difficult to identify. Whatever the reason, incumbent directors’ 
resistance to proxy access arrangements should be taken into account in any assessment of the 
expected incidence of the adoption of such arrangements from a no-access default.  
Furthermore, in contrast to majority voting arrangements, the design of proxy 
arrangements seems to be more complicated and their consequences seem to depend on many 
                                                 
 
63 Id. 
64 See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38626,  68 Fed. Reg. 60784, 
60794 (proposed Oct. 14, 2003). 
65 See, e.g., Letter from Steve Odland, Chairman, President & CEO, AutoZone, Inc. & Chairman, Corp. 
Governance Task Force, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 
(Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt033104.pdf (“The proposed 
rules would have widespread and harmful unintended consequences, enabling a small number of 
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 more design details.66 As a result, as discussed in detail below,67 firms have many ways to 
design proxy access arrangements that in practice make their use by shareholders very difficult. 
This consideration is especially important given the expected reluctance of boards to adopt proxy 
access arrangements that could make a practical difference.  
The evidence of staggered boards is also instructive in assessing how difficult it is for 
shareholder preferences, expressed in precatory shareholder proposals, to produce widespread 
changes that would make it easier to replace directors. For the last two decades, companies have 
generally not been able to get shareholders to approve the adoption of staggered boards..68  
Moreover, shareholders have displayed strong preferences for the removal of staggered boards 
where companies already have them in place. Proposals in favor of de-staggering have obtained, 
on average, more than 70 percent of the votes cast for such proposals in each of the years 2003 to 
2009, with the average percentage of support in 2007 and 2008 reaching levels of 86 percent and 
80 percent respectively.69 This opposition by shareholders has led to de-staggering by a 
significant number of companies, though most of the companies with staggered boards have 
stuck to an arrangement that does not have majority support among shareholders. Among the 
(approximately) 4,000 public firms whose antitakeover arrangements are tracked by 
SharkRepellent.net, about half still have staggered boards in place.70 This evidence suggests that 
strong impediments exist to shareholder efforts to make corporate governance changes that 
would facilitate replacing directors. We now turn to a discussion of these impediments in some 
detail.  
                                                                                                                                                             
shareholders and advisory services to impose significant costs on all shareholders, often for reasons 
wholly unrelated to sound corporate governance or the welfare of the corporation.”). 
66 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
67 See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
68   See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 
713, 727-8 (2003); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover 
Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 759–61 (2003).  
69 These figures are based on a SharkRepellent.net search on October 19, 2009. 
70 This figure is based on a SharkRepellent.net search on September 27, 2009, showing 1,911 corporations 
in the SharkRepellent.net universe with a staggered board and 1,977 without a staggered board. 
 
 
18
 F. Impediments to the Effectiveness of the Precatory Proposals Route  
The Proposal Opponents claim that a no-access default regime with freedom to opt in to 
proxy access will produce access arrangements whenever they are favored by shareholders. The 
evidence discussed above casts doubt on this claim. This subsection discusses three reasons for 
expecting that a no-access default that allows shareholders to include proposals concerning proxy 
access on the corporate ballot will not result in the adoption of such arrangements in all firms 
whose shareholders would benefit from them.  
First, due to the limited incentives shareholders have to make proposals, most companies 
will not receive, and will not expect to receive, shareholder proposals to adopt a proxy access 
arrangement, even when such proposals would pass were they initiated. Second, even if proxy 
access proposals are passed (or are expected to pass), boards may elect not to follow 
shareholders’ explicit preference in favor of proxy access. Third, even in those cases where 
boards adopt a proxy access bylaw—either in response to or in anticipation of the passage of a 
shareholder proposal—the board may adopt a version of an access arrangement that is 
substantially more diluted and restrictive than shareholders favor. 
 
1. The Limited Reach of Precatory Proposals 
The Proposal Opponents implicitly assume that companies whose shareholders would 
pass a proxy access proposal, were one to be initiated, would receive or expect to receive such a 
proposal. But the fact that a proposal would be passed if initiated hardly implies that a proposal 
will be initiated. Most shareholders have little incentive to initiate such proposals, and the 
evidence clearly indicates that shareholder proposals that routinely receive large shareholder 
support are initiated in only a small subset of relevant companies. Although it takes only one 
shareholder to initiate a proposal, most firms do not receive even a single shareholder proposal. 
In particular, according to an analysis of RiskMetrics Group data, less than 25 percent of 
the firms in the S&P 1500 were targeted for corporate governance proposals in each of the years 
2006 and 2007.71 The RiskMetrics shareholder data focuses on S&P 1500 companies because 
                                                 
71 E-mails from Fabrizio Ferri, N.Y. Univ. Leonard N. Stern Sch. of Bus., to Lucian Bebchuk (Oct. 14, 
2009) (on file with The Business Lawyer). 
 
 
19
 shareholder corporate governance proposals are infrequent in other companies.72 According to 
this data, about 50 percent of the S&P 500 firms received such proposals (243 in 2006 and 265 in 
2007).73 Among those S&P 1500 firms not in the S&P 500, only about 10 to 12 percent received 
corporate governance proposals (101 in 2006 and 121 in 2007).74 Note also that, even though 
proposals to de-stagger boards and to adopt majority voting routinely pass when initiated in 
companies with a staggered board and plurality voting (respectively), such proposals are initiated 
only in a small subset of such firms each year. Thus, there is a good basis for expecting that, in a 
no-access default regime, many companies—including most companies outside the S&P 500—
will not expect to be the target of a proxy access proposal, even if such a proposal would pass 
were it to be initiated, and thus the boards of those companies will face little pressure to adopt an 
access arrangement.75
 
2. Precatory Proposals May Be Ignored  
As discussed in section D of this Part, the process that the Proposal Opponents envisage 
is that shareholders will propose precatory resolutions to implement proxy access. However, 
when a precatory resolution in favor of proxy access passes, the board may elect not to follow it. 
As a legal matter, the passage of a precatory resolution does not bind the board—the board is 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 26 (asserting that “collective action costs [for shareholder proposals] 
are low” and referring to what he regards as a large number of shareholder proposals). However, placed in 
the context of the number of publicly traded companies and the number of different corporate governance 
proposals facing shareholders, the number of corporate governance proposals initiated each year is hardly 
large. Indeed, the great majority of publicly traded companies do not receive even a single proposal in any 
given year. The 1,141 proposals Grundfest describes represent an average of 0.12 proposals per publicly 
traded company, or one proposal for every eight publicly traded companies (using the 8,949 publicly 
traded U.S. companies in the Compustat database as of December 31, 2008). Moreover, the number of 
proposals Grundfest refers to includes corporate social responsibility proposals; the number of corporate 
governance proposals is considerably lower (S&P 1500 companies received 652 corporate governance 
proposals in 2008). See GEORGESON, 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW, supra note 50, 
at 14 fig. 1. And in any given year, even the most popular corporate governance issues attract very few 
proposals—in 2008 there were eighty proposals regarding majority voting and sixty regarding “say-on-
pay,” the two most popular issues for shareholder proposals that year. See id. at 5, 6. 
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 legally free to elect to retain the existing state of affairs.76 As a practical matter, the chance that a 
board will fail to follow a successful precatory resolution is likely to be greater if the resolution 
is the first proposal on the subject passed by the company’s shareholders, if the issue is 
especially important to incumbents,77 and if the resolution passes without a large majority.  
This analysis is consistent with the evidence of boards’ failure to follow numerous 
precatory resolutions passed in favor of de-staggering boards. A study by one of us shows that, 
of the precatory resolutions passed by shareholders during the period 1997–2003, boards elected 
not to follow about 69 percent of such resolutions by the fall of 2004.78 Recent evidence suggests 
that the incidence of boards failing to implement de-staggering proposals is now lower—possibly 
as a result of the consistently large support for such resolutions recently—although a significant 
number of firms still continue to have staggered boards despite the passage of one or more 
shareholder resolutions in favor of de-staggering.79 Thus, even in the event that shareholders pass 
resolutions in favor of proxy access in some companies, some boards can be expected to ignore 
such resolutions, and the incidence of such refusals is likely to be higher during the initial years 
in which proxy access resolutions are passed and when such resolutions pass with less than 
overwhelming majorities.  
 
3. Precatory Proposals May Be Only Partly Followed  
There is another reason why the process suggested by the Proposal Opponents cannot be 
expected to result in the proxy arrangements favored by shareholders of particular companies 
                                                 
76 Cf. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775-76 (Del. 1990).  See also the discussion in Andrew R. 
Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can A Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding To Majority 
Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 39-45 (2004).
77 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 852–
56 (2005). 
78 Id. at 854. 
79 Comprehensive Summary of Majority Voting Proposals, 2008, SharkRepellent.net (last visited Dec. 10, 
2009). For instance, between 2001 and 2008, there were fifty-two corporations in which shareholders 
successfully passed at least one precatory resolution recommending the repeal of their particular 
corporation’s staggered board, but, as of September 2009, the respective boards of directors had not taken 
steps to declassify the boards. In eighteen of these instances, shareholders have passed such resolutions on 
more than one occasion. For instance, the shareholders of The Stanley Works have passed resolutions 
calling for the removal of a staggered board in each of the seven annual meetings from 2003 to 2009, yet 
there has been no repeal of the staggered board. 
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 being universally adopted by those companies. Even if the board elects to adopt an access bylaw 
in response to (or in anticipation of) the passage of a precatory shareholder resolution favoring 
proxy access, the board may choose to adopt a bylaw considerably more restrictive than the 
arrangement favored by shareholders. By adopting an access bylaw, the board can claim to 
accommodate its shareholders’ preference. However, the devil is in the details, and the bylaw 
adopted by the board may fall significantly short of that favored by shareholders.80  
In response to (or in anticipation of) shareholder resolutions in favor of a majority voting 
standard, for example, some boards have nonetheless retained the default plurality standard but 
have sought to placate shareholders by adopting a “director resignation policy.”81 Such policies 
require directors receiving a majority of “withhold” votes to tender their resignations, but fall 
short of a majority voting standard, as they are binding neither on directors (to tender their 
resignations), nor on the board (to accept tendered resignations). During the 2009 proxy season, 
directors of Pulte Homes, Inc., and Dollar Tree, Inc., failed to receive a majority of votes cast, 
yet even though both companies had director resignation policies that were triggered by the 
votes, their boards decided not to accept the resignations of the directors.82 As noted above, 
RiskMetrics Group data indicates that 15 percent of companies in the S&P 500 (and 5 percent of 
all companies followed by RiskMetrics Group) have director resignation policies but not 
majority voting rules.83  
This problem is especially significant for proxy access bylaws. As discussed above, the 
design of a proxy access arrangement can critically affect its effectiveness in providing 
shareholders with meaningful access to the company’s proxy materials. It is possible to draft 
                                                 
80 This impediment is largely avoided if shareholders adopt a binding access bylaw. However, as 
discussed earlier, the passage of binding bylaws by shareholders faces considerable impediments, and this 
is not the process that the Proposal Opponents envisage. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
81 For example, in May 2008, shareholders of Invacare Corporation passed a precatory resolution 
recommending adoption of a majority voting policy. Instead, the board of directors adopted a director 
resignation policy. See Comprehensive Summary of Majority Voting Proposals, 2008, SharkRepellent.net 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2009). 
82 See Posting by Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group Risk & Governance Blog, 
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2009/10/001372print.html (Oct. 2, 2009) (“A Closer Look at High Withhold 
Votes”). 
83 See E-mails from Carol Bowie, supra note 61. 
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 proxy access arrangements with thresholds and requirements that largely negate their potential 
value for shareholders.  
To illustrate, consider a company whose board passes a bylaw based on the model access 
bylaw put forward by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.84 An examination of the fine details of 
the model bylaw indicates that it provides access in name only. First, it requires a nominator to 
have more than 5 percent of the voting shares of the corporation (a “5% shareholder”) and does 
not allow shareholder groups to aggregate their holdings for this purpose.85 As a result, if the 
company lacks 5 percent shareholders, or if the 5 percent shareholders are affiliated with 
management, there will effectively be no shareholder access to the ballot. Second, although the 
model bylaw theoretically allows shareholders to place on the ballot nominees numbering up to 
one-third of the number of board seats,86 each 5 percent shareholder may nominate only one 
director.87 Therefore, to have three shareholder nominees included on the ballot of a company 
with nine directors, the company must have at least three 5 percent shareholders, each of which 
must elect to exercise its proxy access rights. Finally, the model bylaw also deters the use of 
proxy access rights by 5 percent shareholders by making such use quite costly: shareholders 
exercising their right to nominate a director are precluded from nominating directors or soliciting 
proxies in the following year88 and are subject to substantial limitations on their ability to sell 
shares, imposing a significant loss of liquidity.89 The adoption of a bylaw with such tight 
restrictions should hardly be viewed as providing shareholders with meaningful proxy access. 
                                                 
 
84 See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ MODEL BYLAW, supra note 55. This model bylaw imposes 
significantly more restrictive conditions on proxy access than the ABA Model Bylaw, supra note 55, 
which is in turn significantly more restrictive than proposed Rule 14a-11. Although the access restrictions 
in bylaws adopted by boards pursuant to the process that the Proposal Opponents envisage will vary, that 
process will allow boards to adopt bylaws that are more restrictive than what shareholders would prefer. 
85 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ MODEL BYLAW, supra note 55, § (b)(v) (defining “Required 
Interest”). 
86 See id. § (b)(i) (defining “Permitted Number,” with provisos, as “one-third of the number of seats on 
the Board of Directors to be filled in the Election (rounded down to the nearest whole number but not less 
than one).” 
87  Id. § (c) (“[E]ach Eligible Stockholder, together with its Affiliates, may nominate one, and not more 
than one, individual under this Section for inclusion in the Corporation’s proxy statement and on its proxy 
card.”). 
88 Id. § (d)(vi). 
89 See id. § (d)(1) (requiring an affidavit delivered by the nominating shareholder to represent that the 
nominating shareholder will “not sell or otherwise dispose of its Beneficial Ownership and Economic 
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 G. Different Access Regimes  
We have so far assumed for the purposes of this Part that shareholders’ preferences are 
binary, for either the access arrangement specified by a federal access regime or no-access. The 
Proposal Opponents stress that “one size does not fit all” and that companies vary considerably 
in their characteristics and circumstances. We now consider the possibility that optimal access 
regimes, and those preferred by shareholders, may differ among companies. We conclude that, 
also under this assumption, an access default would be preferable to retaining a no-access 
default.  
We continue to assume that shareholders will be free to opt out of whichever default rule 
is chosen. In Part III we discuss in detail the manner in which shareholders should be permitted 
to opt out of a federal access regime. Under the SEC’s proposal, firms would be able to adopt 
bylaws that provide more expansive access rights than provided by the federal access regime. As 
will be explained in more detail in Part III, we also support allowing shareholders to adopt 
resolutions opting out of the federal access regime. Thus, a firm would be able to substitute an 
access regime with more restrictive access rights than provided in the federal access regime by 
(i) passing a shareholder resolution to opt out of the federal access regime, and (ii) as the 
company would no longer be governed by the federal access regime, adopting a bylaw providing 
the desired set of access rights. 
Consider a set of companies whose shareholders prefer access regimes (which might vary 
from company to company) that provide access rights that are more restrictive than those 
provided by the federal access regime. Each of these access regimes may be viewed as being 
located on a spectrum between no-access and the federal access regime. In the view of the 
Proposal Opponents, a no-access default should be the baseline from which shareholders of any 
given company in the set opt out to the access arrangement that they prefer. However, setting the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Interest of voting securities of the Corporation so as to reduce the Beneficial Ownership and Economic 
Interest held by such [nominating shareholder], together with its Affiliates, below the [5 percent] 
Required Interest on or prior to the date of the Election (and representing that they have no present 
intention of reducing, within one year following the Election, their aggregate Beneficial Ownership and 
Economic Interest below the greater of (x) the [5 percent] Required Interest and (y) seventy-five percent 
(75%) of their aggregate Beneficial and Economic Interest as of the Advance Notice Date)”). 
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 federal access regime as a default would be more likely to result in a given company becoming 
subject to the access arrangement preferred by its shareholders.  
The reason for this is the asymmetry discussed above between opting out in a direction 
favored by incumbent directors and opting out in a direction disfavored by incumbent directors. 
Because of this asymmetry, if a no-access default is retained, many firms whose shareholders 
prefer an access arrangement would likely remain without such an arrangement. In contrast, if a 
federal access regime is set as a default, and the shareholders of a company prefer an access 
regime that provides more restrictive access rights, a change to the shareholders’ preferred 
regime would be more likely. Such a change would be likely to take place since it would be 
favored not only by the shareholders but also by the directors, and the board could therefore be 
expected to ensure that shareholders have the chance to vote on a resolution to opt out of the 
federal access regime and adopt a bylaw providing the desired access arrangement (or the board 
could pass such a bylaw themselves). We conclude that the case for a no-access default is not 
strengthened by recognizing that “one size does not fit all” and that the optimal access regime 
that shareholders prefer varies among companies. Instead, the impediments to opting out in a 
direction disfavored by directors make a no-access default an inferior starting point for moves to 
optimal access arrangements. 
More generally, assuming a federal access regime is provided as a default, and that 
shareholders are permitted to opt out to both more and less restrictive access rules, the above 
analysis indicates that changes to access rules preferred by shareholders of particular companies 
are less likely to occur where shareholders prefer more expansive access rights than provided by 
the federal regime, than where shareholders prefer less expansive access than provided by the 
federal regime. This conclusion provides an important insight concerning the setting of the 
various dimensions of the federal access regime, such as eligibility thresholds and procedural 
requirements for nominating directors. The SEC should not design the default access regime in 
accordance with what it believes to be optimal for the “average” publicly traded company. 
Because it would be more difficult for shareholders seeking changes to expand access rights than 
to restrict them, the optimal default rule will be one that provides more expansive access rights 
than are likely to be optimal for the “average” company.  
Thus, although a discussion of the design of the various detailed dimensions of the 
federal access regime is beyond the scope of this Article, our analysis of private ordering and the 
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 proxy access debate suggests an important consideration for such an analysis. The design of the 
federal access regime should err on the side of providing meaningful access rights. This would 
result in more companies becoming subject to the exact access arrangements preferred by their 
shareholders.  
H. An Access Regime Should Be the Default  
The above analysis and empirical evidence clearly demonstrates the limitations of the 
process on which Proposal Opponents wish to rely as a substitute for a federal access regime. 
Retaining a no-access default and leaving the adoption of proxy access arrangements to 
company-by-company adoption cannot be expected to result in the general adoption of proxy 
access arrangements by all of the public companies whose shareholders would favor such an 
arrangement. Among the thousands of public companies, many—possibly most—will avoid 
adopting a proxy access arrangement, at least for several years, and a number of those companies 
adopting proxy access arrangements will implement details that are significantly more restrictive 
than those favored by their shareholders.  
It should be stressed that the outcome for public companies as a whole is likely to be 
even worse than the percentage of companies failing to adopt proxy access arrangements favored 
by their shareholders would suggest. That is, the companies that will avoid adopting proxy 
access arrangements are likely to be among those whose directors are already less accountable to 
shareholders and less attentive to shareholder interests—in other words, the companies for which 
effective proxy access is especially important.  
I. Beyond Proxy Access 
Although we have so far focused on proxy access, the analysis in Part II has implications 
that go beyond proxy access—in particular, for the choice of default arrangements with respect 
to other election arrangements. As detailed above, the empirical evidence suggests that 
subjecting directors to enhanced risk of removal in the event of underperformance can be 
expected to increase shareholder value. Given the centrality of election arrangements to the 
corporate structure, public officials would do well to reconsider whether existing arrangements 
that insulate directors from removal are warranted.    
 
 
26
 We have also analyzed the impediments to shareholders forcing companies to opt in to 
arrangements favored by shareholders but disfavored by boards, and have discussed evidence 
showing how these impediments substantially limit the speed and efficacy of adopting such 
arrangements. Our analysis lends support to the “reversible defaults” analysis put forward earlier 
by one of us together with Assaf Hamdani.90 In selecting default arrangements, public officials 
should take into account the fact that a switch from an inefficient default to a more efficient 
arrangement that would be favored by shareholders is more likely to occur when such a switch is 
favored by the board than when it is disfavored. This consideration should be given significant 
weight when defaults are initially selected, and also whenever they are re-examined.  
In addition to changing the default rule that currently denies shareholder director 
nominees access to the corporate ballot, other defaults should be re-examined with the above 
considerations in mind. For example, we believe there is a strong basis for replacing the current 
default of plurality voting with a majority voting default. Although there is now widespread 
recognition that majority voting should be the standard for director elections, we have shown that 
its diffusion has been much more limited than is commonly supposed: as noted above, a 
substantial number of S&P 500 companies, and a large majority of the thousands of public 
companies outside the S&P 500, remain subject to plurality voting. This is due to the difficulties 
of getting public companies, and especially smaller companies that are not usually the target of 
shareholder proposals, to adopt arrangements favored by shareholders but not by boards of 
directors.  
Accordingly, it is not sufficient to allow companies to opt in to majority voting. As long 
as plurality voting remains the default, many if not most public companies will be governed that 
way, even if their shareholders prefer majority voting and would not support plurality voting if 
asked to vote on the matter. Switching to a majority voting default, which will contribute to 
improving corporate elections, is therefore warranted. 
III. SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS BE ALLOWED TO OPT OUT OF THE FEDERAL ACCESS REGIME? 
 Part II of this Article concluded that there is a strong case for replacing the current no-
access default with a proxy access default. Because state law has failed to provide proxy access 
                                                 
90 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40.  
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 arrangements, federal law should provide a proxy access default rule. We now consider whether 
and to what extent opting out of a federal access regime should be permitted.  
The Proposal Opponents argue forcefully in favor of allowing opting out; this is the 
position taken by the Business Roundtable Letter,91 the Seven Firms Letter,92 and by the letters 
of numerous law firms93 and corporations.94 Indeed, Grundfest goes so far as to claim that an 
SEC rule that did not allow opting out would be irrational, to such a degree that it would fail the 
rationality test of the Administrative Procedure Act.95
Section A begins by pointing out the inconsistencies between the Proposal Opponents’ 
strong support for the ability to opt out of a proxy access regime and (i) their prior positions 
against the ability to opt out of the current no-access regime when the SEC considered allowing 
such opting out in 2007, and (ii) their acceptance of mandatory arrangements making it difficult 
for shareholders to replace directors, from which shareholders are not permitted to opt out. We 
also note that the Proposal Opponents overstate the strength of the case for allowing opting out, 
                                                 
91 See Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 7, at 47 (“[W]e believe that shareholders should be 
permitted to propose amendments to a company’s bylaws that would increase or decrease the 
requirements of the [Proposed Rules].”). 
92 See Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 1–2 (“any prescriptive proxy access regime should permit 
private ordering under state law so as to permit stockholders to modify the SEC’s proxy access regime as 
they see fit, including by opting out of the SEC’s proxy access regime in its entirety”). 
93 See, e.g., Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 10 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-263.pdf 
[hereinafter Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Letter] (“If the SEC enacts a federal shareholder access rule, 
we urge that it adopt a default rule that each company may supplement, replace or repeal as befits its 
individual circumstances.”); id. at 11 (“no access rule [the SEC] adopts should prevent shareholders and 
the companies in which they have invested from opting out of, or otherwise modifying, one or more 
aspects of that rule”). See also Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
430.pdf (“if Rule 14a-11 is adopted, it should be . . . a default rule that permits companies to opt out with 
shareholder approval”). 
94 See, e.g., Letter from Mary T. Afflerbach, Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-472.pdf (“companies, boards and shareholders should be allowed to determine the proxy 
access regime at their companies”). 
95 See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 29, where he suggests that it is irrational to accept that shareholders 
have the capacity to nominate and elect directors, and simultaneously to view them as not capable of 
making good choices about whether to opt out of an access regime; he contends that this contradiction, 
and a second contradiction that he describes, “are likely fatal to the Proposed Rules under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.” 
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 and that preventing opting out in a way that would dilute the protections accorded to 
shareholders by the proxy access regime is consistent with the general structure of the proxy 
rules. In Section B we turn to our own position on the subject. Although prohibiting opting out 
that would weaken shareholder rights would not be unreasonable, we support allowing opting out 
of the proxy access regime in both directions—provided, however, that such opting out is done 
by a process that contains certain important elements and conditions. We also argue that 
allowing opting out of proxy access should be accompanied by a reconsideration of existing rules 
that prevent shareholders from opting out of arrangements that make replacing directors more 
difficult.  
A. Some Questions About the Proposal Opponents’ Position on Opting Out  
The Proposal Opponents present a forceful defense of shareholders’ right to opt out of 
proxy access rules.96 The Seven Firm Letter, for example, stresses that depriving shareholders of 
their right to opt out of the access regime would be “wrong as a matter of policy.”97 This 
recognition of the value of shareholder choice expressed by corporations and corporate law firms 
is welcome and encouraging. However, it is interesting to observe that many of the Proposal 
Opponents seem more inclined to allow opting out of arrangements making it easier to replace 
directors than opting out of arrangements making it difficult to replace directors. Their 
underlying position seems to be guided not by the view that permitting opting out is desirable, 
but rather by the view that director removal should be difficult.  
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Letter, supra note 92, at 10 ( “If the SEC enacts a federal 
shareholder access rule, we urge that it adopt a default rule that each company may supplement, replace 
or repeal as befits its individual circumstances.”); Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 7, at 47–48 
(“We believe that there is no legitimate reason to allow shareholder proposals that would impose more 
lenient but not more restrictive access requirements on nominating shareholders. Rather, the Commission 
should let companies and their shareholders decide whether or not, and to what degree, they wish to 
permit shareholders to include their director nominees in company proxy materials.”). 
97 Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 3 (“If the SEC adopts proposed Rule 14a-11, stockholders should 
have the option to opt out of proposed Rule 14a-11 either by a stockholder vote or ratification of board 
action. . . . [P]roposed Rule 14a-11 would deprive stockholders of their ability to exercise their rights 
under enabling state laws to implement the specific form of proxy access that they believe best fits their 
particular company and fellow stockholders, or alternatively to choose to forego entirely the costs and 
burdens of proxy access. We think this result is wrong as a matter of policy and raises significant 
administrative law issues.”). 
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 Two inconsistencies in particular are worth discussing. First, the Proposal Opponents’ 
current position in favor of allowing opting out conflicts with the position many of them 
expressed in 2007 when the SEC considered allowing shareholders satisfying certain eligibility 
standards to include on the corporate ballot proposals to opt out of the current no-access default 
(the “2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule”).98 Although the Proposal Opponents now argue strongly 
that shareholders should be allowed to opt out of any access regime, in 2007 many of them—
including the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a number of prominent 
corporate law firms—strongly opposed allowing shareholders to include proposals to opt out of 
the current no-access rule on the corporate ballot.99 For example, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, in a comment letter regarding the 2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule, indicated that it 
“strongly oppose[d] the [2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule] as unnecessary, overreaching and 
potentially disruptive and harmful to companies and shareholders.”100 At the time, the strong 
opposition to allowing shareholders to opt out of the current no-access default prevailed, and the 
SEC adopted the current rule allowing companies to exclude opt-out proposals.101  
Comparing the positions of many Proposal Opponents in 2007 with their positions today, 
it seems that the fundamental principle underlying their current position is not that of permitting 
shareholders to opt out and choose the arrangements they find most fitting. Rather, the position 
                                                 
98 Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56160, 72 Fed. Reg. 43466 (proposed July 27, 
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter 2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule]. 
99 See, e.g., Letter from David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-482.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Chamber of Commerce 
Letter]; Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Comm. Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec. of the ABA 
Section of Bus. Law, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-126.pdf; Letter from Anne M. Mulcahy, Chairman & 
CEO, Xerox Corp., and Chairman, Bus. Roundtable Corp. Governance Task Force, to Nancy M. Morris, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-
07/s71707-77.pdf; Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-458.pdf; Letter 
from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 19, 
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-190.pdf. 
100 2007 Chamber of Commerce Letter, supra note 98, at 2. 
101 See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56914, 
72 Fed. Reg. 70450 (Dec. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). This rule was initially proposed 
in Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56161, 72 
Fed. Reg. 43488 (proposed July 27, 2007). 
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 of these Proposal Opponents regarding opting out seems to depend on the nature of the default 
arrangement in place: they strongly support opting out when proxy access is the default, but 
strongly oppose opting out when no-access is the default. Although these Proposal Opponents 
have reversed their 2007 position and now support allowing shareholders to opt out of the 
current no-access default, this new position seems in reality to be part of an effort to avoid the 
adoption of a stronger proxy access regime by the SEC.  
The second tension worth noting is between the Proposal Opponents’ opposition to a 
proxy access regime that does not allow shareholders to opt out, and their acceptance of various 
arrangements that make it difficult for shareholders to replace directors, from which 
arrangements shareholders cannot opt out. Such arrangements have long existed under both 
federal law and state corporate law. For example, several of the federal proxy rules introduced in 
the 1950s with respect to consent solicitations have long made mounting proxy challenges more 
difficult and more costly.102 Similarly, state law includes mandatory rules that prevent 
shareholders from initiating charter amendments.103 To the best of our knowledge, none of the 
Proposal Opponents now championing opting out by shareholders from proxy access have 
expressed dissatisfaction about shareholders’ inability to opt out of current arrangements that 
make it difficult to replace directors, or has proposed changes to facilitate such opting out. This 
is again consistent with the Proposal Opponents’ fundamental commitment to arrangements that 
make electoral challenges more difficult rather than to arrangements that facilitate private 
ordering and opting out. 
Finally, before proceeding, we should note that the Proposal Opponents substantially 
overstate the strength of the case for allowing opting out. The Proposal Opponents suggest that 
there can be no justification for not permitting opt-outs that would dilute the rights provided by a 
                                                 
102 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 645 (2003) (“In the 1950s, the 
SEC federalized proxy contests to make them harder for insurgents to win, moving even before states 
acted definitively.”); id. at 613 (“The 1950s proxy rules, widely viewed as responses to managerial 
pressure, impeded insurgents.” (citing John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Investor Protection Versus 
Market Efficiency, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 263–67 (1991)). For another discussion of the proxy rules from 
this perspective, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from 
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1805–07 (2006). 
103 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2001). 
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 federal access regime.104 In fact, both state corporate law and federal securities law establish 
protections for shareholders, both in general and with respect to corporate elections, which 
shareholders cannot vote to dilute.105 There is also a substantial body of academic work that 
identifies and discusses at length various reasons for adopting minimum standards of investor 
protection as mandatory rules from which opting out is not permitted.106  
Moreover, it should be noted that the longstanding approach of the shareholder proposals 
rule has been to provide shareholders with minimum rights of access to the company’s proxy 
card for their proposals, and to allow companies to provide shareholders with additional rights, 
but not to derogate from the set minimum.107 More generally, the proxy rules—and the securities 
laws in general—have long provided mandatory arrangements establishing a minimum level of 
protection for public investors, allowing companies to add additional protections, but not to 
reduce investors’ protections below the established minimum. Thus, an “asymmetric opting out” 
arrangement that allows opting out of the federal proxy access regime only to expand 
shareholder rights but not to weaken such rights would be consistent with the longstanding 
structure of the federal securities laws.  
B. Opting out of the Federal Access Regime 
Although there is therefore a reasonable basis for supporting asymmetric opting out, we 
believe that the SEC should consider allowing “symmetric opting out”—that is, opting out of the 
                                                 
104 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 12, at 4-5 (viewing as irrational any proxy access regime that does not 
allow shareholders to opt out in order to weaken the rights provided to them by the regime).  
105 For example, state corporate law does not enable shareholders to opt out of their rights to vote on 
directors annually, and federal securities law does not enable shareholders to vote to approve their being 
furnished by proxy challengers with less information than is required by the proxy rules.  
106 For an early set of articles on the subject, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). This symposium includes articles from authors representing different 
perspectives and methodologies—for example, Victor Brudney, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, 
Robert Clark, and Jeffrey Gordon—who all support some limits on opting out. One of us has over time 
written extensively on the various reasons for placing some limits on opting out. See, e.g.,  Lucian Ayre 
Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003); Lucian Ayre 
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).   
107 See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517–18 (3d Cir. 1947). 
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 proxy access regime either to strengthen or weaken the access rights of shareholders. One of the 
factors motivating us to take this position is the inevitable uncertainty about the optimal 
eligibility thresholds for proxy access in any given company. We believe that the difficulties 
shareholders face in opting out of default rules in the “direction” disfavored by the board—that 
is, toward less restrictive requirements for access—make it desirable to set reasonably low 
eligibility thresholds for the access default. However, if eligibility thresholds are set at a 
reasonably low level, it may be desirable in turn to allow shareholders to tighten those 
requirements if they consider more restrictive requirements to be preferable.  
However, any opting out of the federal access regime should be permitted only if the 
opting-out process is designed in such a way that companies are released from the federal access 
regime if and only if their shareholders prefer a different arrangement. Below we discuss several 
principles that should govern such an opt-out process.  
 
1.  Opting Out Only by Majority Shareholder Approval  
We believe that boards of directors should not on their own be able to opt out of 
governance arrangements that make it more difficult to replace incumbent directors.108 Thus, 
companies should not be able to opt out of a federal access regime by means of board-adopted 
bylaws. In our view, the federal access regime should allow opting out only by a shareholder 
resolution passed by shareholders representing a majority of the outstanding shares.109 Boards 
should be free to initiate a vote on such a resolution, as should shareholders. With boards free to 
initiate votes on opt-out resolutions, such votes are likely to occur whenever passage of such opt-
out resolutions is likely—that is, whenever a majority of the shareholders prefer to opt out of the 
access regime. Such opt-out resolutions, in their most basic form, would merely remove from the 
company’s shareholders the access rights provided by the federal access regime. However, as 
will be discussed below, such resolutions could be accompanied by proposals to adopt bylaws 
                                                 
108 For an analysis supporting this principle, see Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 23, at 709–
11. 
109 A similar approach is used by section 216 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), 
which prevents directors from repealing bylaws on majority voting that have been adopted by a vote of 
shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001 & Supp. 2008). Unfortunately, the DGCL does not 
extend this principle to other shareholder-adopted bylaws.  
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 that would provide alternative access rights distinct from those conferred by the federal access 
regime.  
 
2. Shareholder Ability to Reverse Earlier Opt-Out Decisions  
The process for opting out by shareholders from a federal access regime should leave the 
door open for shareholders to later reverse their choice and opt back in to proxy access. 
Shareholders’ preferences may shift over time, with new information and as the shareholder 
body changes. The SEC’s rules should therefore ensure that shareholders wishing to opt back in 
to the federal access regime do not face excessive impediments: opting back in should occur by 
the same process as opting out, and should be similarly easy.110 In particular, any firm that is no 
longer subject to the federal access regime as the result of an opt-out resolution would again 
become subject to the access regime once shareholders representing a majority of the outstanding 
shares approve a resolution to that effect.111 Public companies will therefore not be subject to the 
federal access regime only if (i) an opt-out resolution has been passed by shareholders 
representing a majority of the outstanding shares, and (ii) no subsequent resolution to opt back in 
to the federal access regime has been passed by shareholders representing a majority of 
outstanding shares.  
 
3. Permissibility of Bylaws that Add to Access Rights Provided by Federal Law  
Firms should be free to adopt bylaws that allow shareholders additional rights to access 
the company’s proxy card beyond the baseline rights provided by the federal securities laws—
that is, either the access rights provided by the federal access regime, or a basis of no access 
rights if shareholders have adopted a resolution opting out of the federal access regime. If most 
                                                 
110 An alternative way to ensure that the non-applicability of the federal proxy access regime to a 
corporation continues to be supported by its shareholders is to have any decision to opt out of the access 
regime “sunset” after a fixed number of years. For example, the SEC could specify that a corporation is 
not subject to the federal proxy access regime if shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares 
approved a resolution (which was not subsequently reversed) to opt out of the access regime during the 
preceding five years. 
111 One advantage of having the opt-out done by shareholder resolution rather than by adoption of a bylaw 
is that companies may have charter provisions requiring a supermajority of shareholders to approve bylaw 
amendments; this would effectively make it much harder for shareholders who had opted out to later opt 
back in to a proxy access regime. 
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 shareholders prefer an access regime that is more restrictive than the federal access regime, we 
would expect the board to initiate a resolution opting out of the federal access regime, coupled 
with a bylaw amendment to adopt the more restrictive access regime desired by shareholders. In 
this way, shareholders would be able to opt out into alternative and more restrictive access 
regimes instead of being able to opt out only into a no-access regime. If shareholders prefer a 
regime that provides more expansive access than the federal access regime, they should be able 
to adopt such an expansive access regime by augmenting the federal access regime with a bylaw 
providing additional access rights.  
 
4. Access to Arguments and Information Against Opting Out   
The SEC’s rules should ensure that shareholders voting on a proposal to opt out of the 
federal proxy access regime have access to information explaining both sides of the issue. 
Without such a requirement, the company’s proxy statement, distributed to all shareholders 
eligible to vote on the opt-out resolution, would contain only the views expressed by the 
company’s board in favor of opting out—if a shareholder wished to present the case against 
opting out the shareholder would have to engage in a costly proxy solicitation. To ensure that 
shareholders voting on an opt-out proposal are informed about both sides of the issue, the SEC 
could consider requiring companies to include in their proxy materials a standard statement, 
drafted by the SEC, that explains the benefit to shareholders of proxy access provided by the 
federal regime.  
C. Beyond Proxy Access  
As we have discussed, the debate on proxy access has led public companies and 
corporate law firms to recognize and stress the value of allowing shareholders to opt out of 
governance arrangements. This recognition should lead as well to a general reconsideration of 
existing restrictions on shareholders’ ability to opt out of governance arrangements that make it 
difficult for shareholders to replace directors. The adoption of SEC rules permitting shareholders 
to opt out of the federal access regime should be accompanied by such reconsideration. The 
SEC, Congress, and state legislatures should closely review these restrictions on shareholders 
opting out of the prevailing arrangements governing corporate elections.  
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 Public officials could start by considering how to facilitate the ability of shareholders to, 
among other things, (i) opt in to annual elections in companies that currently have a staggered 
board, (ii) adopt bylaws governing elections without being required to include “fiduciary outs” 
that eliminate much of the bylaws’ potential significance, (iii) limit the use of poison pills that 
make it difficult to remove directors, and (iv) opt out of arrangements that make it difficult for 
institutional investors to coordinate their actions. We hope that the recent realization by many 
public corporations and corporate law firms of the value of private ordering and allowing 
shareholders to opt out of corporate governance arrangements will lead them to support such 
changes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to contribute to the debate on the SEC’s proxy access reform and 
governance reforms more generally. In particular, the Article has focused on “meta” objections 
that accept the desirability of reforms but argue that such reforms should be left to adoption 
through board action in response to shareholder proposals, against the background of the status 
quo default rule. There are strong reasons for replacing the current no-access default. In 
particular, there are reasons for believing that a proxy access regime is more likely to be 
efficient, and, moreover, that the greater difficulty of opting out where disfavored by the board 
(compared to where the board is in favor of opting out) provides a strong reason for adopting a 
federal access regime as a default. We further identify certain principles that should guide any 
opting out of the federal access regime. Our analysis has significant implications, beyond the 
proxy access debate, for the choice of corporate default arrangements in general and for the 
processes of opting out from such arrangements. We hope that our analysis will be useful to the 
SEC as it decides how to move forward with proxy access reform, as well as to future 
examinations of governance reforms in the critical areas of corporate elections and shareholder 
rights. 
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